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VII.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES. 
By W. TUDOE JONES. 
§ 1. Introduction.—The increasing importance of this subject 
in the Philosophy of the Present is my reason for bringing it 
forward before the members of the Aristotelian Society. I t 
is surprising how very little attention has been called to the 
subject of Values in the works of English and American 
thinkers. Several writers have, it is true, called attention to 
the subject, but with one or two exceptions they have used the 
term Values as something which did not imply a problem at 
all, and which could be used of anything in either the natural 
or the philosophical sciences. There have been but the slightest 
attempts made to show the meaning and significance of Values, 
their origin and scope, their relation to the various sciences in 
various degrees, their relation to the individual, and their 
over-individual characteristics. Professor Urban's work on 
Valuation seems to be as yet the only work which has 
attempted to show that Values constitute a Philosophy of their 
own—a Philosophy which no one of the particular branches of 
Philosophy as at present constituted exactly covers. I t is for 
this reason that I venture to think that the time has arrived 
when the term Value should be once again brought to life, 
and that it alone should be shown to cover the whole field of 
human thought and endeavour in a co-ordinating and synthetic 
manner. Of course, dealing with a subject which covers so 
vast a field, nothing more than an outline can be presented 
within the limits of one paper, and much of importance will 
have to be left out. The main thesis attempted in Values 
includes no less than the necessity of presenting a Lebensan-
schauung for man upon which he can build a Weltanschauung. 
§ 2. The Place of the Subject (Values) in the Philosophy of 
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200 W. TUDOR JONES. 
the Present.—Though it is true that the subject of Values 
has received as yet but little attention in the English-speaking 
countries of the world, it has during the past ten years received 
a great deal of attention on the Continent of Europe. The 
literature on the subject has increased enormously, and the 
battle over Values is as great in Germany, Austria, and 
Italy as is the battle over the Absolute in this country. A 
reference to the works of Liebmann, Windelband, Eickert, 
Miinsterberg, Max Weber, and of their pupils in Germany; 
to the works of Meinong and Eisler in Austria; and of Croce, 
Varisco, and Aliotta in Italy, is sufficient to show that a new 
importance has suddenly been given once again to Values.* In 
fact, a crisis of far-reaching importance has arisen concerning 
the meaning and scope of Philosophy. The reason for this 
crisis is not difficult to discover. I t is felt that the promises 
and even the achievements of Natural Science during the past 
half a century have left out of consideration the larger and 
better part of man's nature. During the latter half of the 
nineteenth century the rapid advance of the Natural Sciences 
seemed to promise solutions of the greatest significance with 
regard to our views of the Universe and of Life. But, in the 
main, the results have dealt with Origins and Laws, and both 
of these are no more than partial and fragmentary truths of 
the contents and possibilities of man's nature. The former 
(Origins) has achieved no more than to fill up gaps concerning 
the natural and psychical nature of man. It has discovered 
many factors which have operated during man's long history. 
So far as Natural Science confined itself to this work such 
knowledge proved itself to be of great use. But many 
advocates of Natural Science have not been satisfied with 
finding the terminus of their work there, and have been 
unwilling to hand on their problems to the philosopher. They 
* Another remarkable instance, pointing in the same direction, is 
found in Hoffding's Philosophy of Religion and Mensehliche Oedanken. 
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have even attempted to confine the meaning of man to the 
meaning of his history as presented by natural science; they 
have framed into a synthesis the separate factors of man's 
natural history, and have reduced him as much as possible to 
the lowest common denominator—the denominator of a 
mechanical, causal Universe. To know how we have become 
what we are, and to know that others are in all essentials what 
we ourselves are, is doubtless a light of importance on man's 
life. But such knowledge has its limitations—limitations 
which Natural Science has been slow to acknowledge. To 
know where I have come from and how I have come to be 
what I am can mean no more than dealing with the operations 
of factors which have taken place in my history. But every 
human being is more than the factors of his history. And it 
is the presence of a core of reality which is more than the 
separate external factors that has constituted the variety and 
the progress which we find in the human world. We are not 
now what we were, because something has become a self-
conscious centre where external and internal factors meet and 
obtain a meaning other than that which they could ever get 
by leaving man's potentiality out of account. I t is unnecessary 
to prove the existence of such a centre : it is evident that man 
is a thinking being and is capable of modifying and even of 
rising above an environment which impinges upon him from the 
outside and blind instincts and impulses which tend to keep 
him on the animal level. Whenever such a self-consciousness 
operates (and it operates everywhere in human beings) there 
is an actual beginning of a new situation which cannot be 
accounted for entirely by its origin. The Past is doubtless 
present in the self-conscious Subject, but it is no mere lumber 
accumulating there and becoming the ruler of life; it is some-
thing other, which can and does become subsidiary to the 
claims and demands of an active self-conscious Subject. In so 
far as the Past is present in consciousness, it is not a mere 
replica of what happened as external events, but is a material 
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202 W. TUDOE JONES. 
which means so much and has so much significance as a self-
conscious, active being is capable of giving it. In order to 
make any material of his own Past an actual portion of his 
own experience, man has to think such material. Evidently 
the thinking of the material is something in the Present and is 
ever moving towards a Future. Unless, therefore, we take into 
account what the thinking Subject now is and is capable of 
becoming, we cannot, as already hinted, deal with anything more 
than his partial and fragmentary history. I t is therefore in 
the content of consciousness that the real essential nature of man 
is to be found, for it is there alone that the material of the 
external world and of the events of history are to obtain their 
meaning and significance. I t is clear, of course, that conscious-
ness must obtain a great deal of the material from the outside, 
and it is also clear that the nature of the material colours the 
nature of consciousness, but it is also true that consciousness 
always in a greater or lesser degree chooses its material; it 
selects or rejects perpetually according to its wants and needs. 
In this manner man is not only acted upon by the external, but 
he, in his turn, reacts upon what is presented to him. His 
thought, feeling, and will choose or discard; and this is 
necessitated upon him along the whole scale of his existence 
from the level of physical self-preservation up to the level of 
the highest synthesis he is able to frame as the norm of his 
life. I t is the presence of such phenomena and others similar 
that marks the limits of Natural Science and makes its results 
but initial, fragmentary, and external explanations of man's 
nature and his place in the Universe. 
If Natural Science fails to take into account the significant 
in man's nature by a description of Origins, how does Science 
fare with regard to its other claim of Law ? Has this latter 
anything of importance to offer concerning man's nature ? The 
answer is, very little, and that of secondary importance. The 
progress of Science has consisted in a large measure in discovering 
qualities in phenomena which previously appeared unconnected 
 by guest on June 9, 2016
http://aristotelian.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES. 203 
and isolated. This very process is a move from reality as that 
reality exists in things. The multiplicity of things have somehow 
to be brought to a unity because we want to know about things 
and to use things in the future. But, as Bergson and others have 
pointed out, this process is no more than the formation of general 
concepts concerning actual perceivable objects—objects that 
live their own life and change from moment to moment. Such 
general concepts cannot grant us the actual reality, for they are 
built up by a process of abstraction. If such concepts cannot 
grant us the reality of any single thing in the physical world, 
how is it ever possible for them to say anything of importance 
concerning the ideal content of the world of consciousness—a 
content whose reality does not consist in its relation to a world of 
things but to a world of the Sollen. They cannot possibly do it. 
If Philosophy then is to take into account the whole of man's 
nature it is clear that its material and methods must be different 
in some important respects from those of Natural Science. I t is 
by overlooking this fact that such chaos has been brought by 
natural scientists into the domain of Philosophy. There were 
signs that such a chaos was beginning to be dispersed, and that 
men of science had become conscious of the confines of their 
provinces, but the evil begins again to appear amongst 
philosophers themselves. Mr. Eussell is offering us anew the 
old empirical definition of Philosophy, and promising great gains 
which will accrue to Philosophy if the methods of Science are 
adopted. He would have us believe that man's " ethical and 
religious motives, in spite of the splendidly imaginative systems 
to which they have given rise, have been on the whole a 
hindrance to the progress of philosophy, and ought now to be 
consciously thrust aside by those who wish to discover philo-
sophical truth."* We are further told that we are to seek " to 
study the methods of science" and transplant these into the 
realm of Philosophy. In the first place, Mr. Eussell overlooks, 
* Scientific Method in Philosophy, pp. 3, 4. 
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204 W. TUDOR JONES. 
throughout the whole of his paper, the fact that the conclusions 
of Natural Science itself are mental constructions concerning 
the physical universe, and in fact constitute a kind of second 
world (mental in its structure) which is indispensable for man in 
order to describe and explain the phenomena of the physical 
world. Doubtless the methods of description, analysis, genetic 
explanation, induction, and deduction used in Natural Science 
are also used in Philosophy. But these are only modes of handling 
material, and though the methods may be the same the material 
is different. "We are bound to take a stand in the mental 
sciences different from the one taken in the physical sciences 
because our material is different. For instance, in the mental 
sciences the idea of End has a validity which it cannot possess 
in the physical world, for without its presence no mental 
science could have ever arisen. The same may be said with 
regard to the idea of Value. The significance and worth which 
things have for a willing and feeling Subject differentiate 
entirely such things in such a relation from the relation 
which things have in their " objective " aspect as conceived by 
the scientist. In the former relation the things have value or 
are deemed valueless according to the feeling and decision of 
the Subject; in the latter relation the things are " neutral"— 
they do not come within the domain of the Subject in the 
same intimate manner in relation to his life. The fact 
that material, different in its nature from that with which the 
natural scientist deals, is present as the subject-matter of 
Philosophy may necessitate a different method of treating it 
from that employed in the Natural Sciences. And, as we shall 
see later on, this is actually the case. The presence of material 
consisting of Ends and Values has to deal with a thinking-
feeling-willing Subject and its relation to Ideals which do not 
exist in Space as the objects of the physical world, and do not 
exist in Time in the sense that Time is conceived as a perpetual 
flow of the moments. The individual, it is true, has material 
which proceeds from the world of Things, and in so far as this 
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES. 205 
is the case the logical methods employed in Science have to be 
employed here, although it ought not to be forgotten that any 
and every material as presented to a living Subject with needs 
and feelings and volition is different, though it has come from 
Space, from the material which the scientist takes into account 
in an abstract way in a so-called " objective" space. The 
material which the philosopher handles, even when it proceeds 
from Space to the individual, has to come into contact with the 
self-conscious thinking subject, and when this contact takes 
place the material which proceeded from the external world is 
now transformed into a new kind of Dimension—it becomes 
value, meaning, and significance. The thinking-feeling-willing 
Subject also comes into contact with " worlds " other than the 
physical world. He comes into perpetual contact with his 
own subjective world, with the world of other personalities, 
of history, and of the social atmosphere which surrounds him. 
In all these worlds Totalities or Wholes are present. The 
material presented to the individual is made up of the thoughts 
and actions of his own life, of other lives, of the life of the 
human world. There is thus present in his consciousness more 
than he himself as an individual is or can be at any one moment 
of his experience. Had it not been for this fact there could 
not have been any kind of progress in human life or thought. 
I t may be that there is no Whole which comprises every aspect of 
life at every moment, but that there are Wholes covering various 
phases of life cannot be doubted. A whole need not be a 
" whole of things " as Mr. Eussell seems to make us believe : it 
need not be concerned with the whole of things. I t is sufficient 
for it, at least for most of its time, to be concerned with a 
universal within the particular realm upon which the mind is 
engaged—be that the realm of Logic, ^Esthetics, or Ethics. The 
" logical atomism" advocated by Mr. Eussell leaves out of 
account the presence of Wholes which alone make a common 
corporate life possible; and such a " logical atomism," if it 
existed, could only do so in a world where human beings could 
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206 W. TUDOE JONES. 
not understand one another. In other words, such a world 
could not exist for long, and certainly it could not develop. 
The attempts which have been made in the past to reduce the 
world of the Ideal to the world of Fact have broken down one 
after the other. Even if we grant that our ethical needs, for 
instance, are merely our own, we must still remember that they 
are a part of the Universe, and that any theoretical conception of 
the world which leaves them out of account is a construction 
with the best things in the world left out. We are compelled to 
take our needs into account, to frame out of them, if not a 
"theoretical view of the World," still a view of Life. A 
" theoretical view of the World " with no more of man's nature 
in it than can be dovetailed into the conceptions of Natural 
Science is a caricature of the world and of life. The reason for 
the failure of Philosophy, which Mr. Eussell offers at the close 
of his paper (p. 30), applies far more to the natural scientists 
who shut their eyes to every kind of reality which is not tangible 
to one or other of the senses than to the idealists who refuse to 
construct a theoretical view of the Universe with the view of 
Human Life either left out altogether or reduced to a " mere 
flowering" of a mechanical process. The reason which Mr. 
Eussell gives for the failure of Philosophy ought to be heeded 
by all who have much to say of the Universe and little to say 
of Man. " The failure of philosophy hitherto has been due in 
the main to haste and ambition; patience and modesty, here as 
in other sciences, will open the road to solid and durable 
progress " (p. 30). 
Let us turn for a moment again to one of the points previously 
touched on—the place of Law in Science. As already pointed 
out, the conclusions of the scientist are mental conclusions: they 
are non-sensuous and of a universal character. They deal with 
the phenomena of the physical world, but they themselves are 
not portions of those phenomena. And besides, such conceptions 
are static abstractions of the physical world. If such a norm of 
physical science cannot come into contact with external reality, 
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES. 207 
how can it ever come into contact with the domain of indivi-
duality as this is experienced by man ? Every attempt at lowering 
Philosophy to a scientific level is to destroy the possibility of 
turning into some kind of cosmos the world of mind or spirit. 
My space does not permit the further treatment of this matter, 
but it is quite obvious that leading philosophers are feeling that, 
in some essential respects at least, other methods than those 
employed in science and empirical philosophy are needful in the 
realm of Philosophy proper if mind in itself, and not merely mind 
as an appendage of matter or of the universal conceptions of 
Natural Science, is to be further investigated with any hope of 
fruitful results. 
Philosophy has then to deal primarily with a View of Life, 
and only with a View of the Universe in so far as such a View 
of the Universe springs from such a View of Life. For we have 
constantly to bear in mind that it is only out of a View of Life that 
the Universe can attain any value and significance. Otherwise 
the Universe is " neutral" with regard to worth or values. Philo-
sophy has thus to start with the Phenomenology of Consciousness 
and not with the Natural Science of Consciousness. Philosophy 
is not a mere Psychology, although Psychology like Natural 
Science presents it with material. The material of Psychology 
is more closely allied to the content of consciousness than the 
facts of Natural Science, but even in Psychology the relation 
between physical and mental processes constitutes its main work 
unless it trespasses on other Sciences whose content and aim are 
quite different from those of Psychology. It is, I think, 
important to confine Psychology as closely as possible to the 
Natural Sciences. To extend it into the realms of Ethics and 
Metaphysics, as was done by the late Professor William James, 
is bound to lead to confusion with regard to great problems of 
the difference between analysis and synthesis, the whole and the 
part, the teleology of consciousness, etc.* 
* The same remark applies to Mr. Arthur Lynch's Psychology: a New 
System. 
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Thus, the limits of Natural Science and Psychology in dealing 
with the total content of consciousness have necessitated an 
insistence, during the past few years, upon the creation of a 
Philosophy which will deal with the total content of conscious-
ness as this is revealed in the thinking-feeling-willing Subject in 
all the relations of life. Such a Philosophy will be a kind of 
co-ordination of the various mental sciences from the sides of 
Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Metaphysics, and Eeligion. But the 
mental sciences as now divided do not make an equal contribu-
tion to such a system of Values. It is for this reason that 
Philosophy may be divided into two divisions. 
§ 3. The Two Main Divisions of Philosophy.—Philosophy 
from very early times—at least from the time of Aristotle—has 
attempted to satisfy two needs. On the one hand, it has 
attempted to extend the domain of Knowledge so far as to 
construct some kind of systematic view of the Universe. I t has 
created theories of the Universe in an objective manner—in a 
manner which was supposed to include Man as well as the 
Universe. But, on the other hand, each theoretical view of the 
Universe has left Man as a mere passive spectator of the 
Universe—a being whose life and destiny were determined by 
powers or forces outside himself and outside any kind of 
reaction which any individual or any number of individuals 
could exert on the Universe. Here, again, what has been 
touched on before has to be re-emphasized, viz., that such a 
theoretical Philosophy does not include the whole truth of what 
exists in the Universe. Man exists in the Universe not as a 
mere passive spectator but as an active being capable of 
exercising his "Will upon a portion at least of the Universe, of 
thinking the Universe, and of leading a life quite other than 
that found on the physical plane. 
Thus alongside of a theoretical Philosophy there has always 
existed, sometimes in the background, sometimes in the fore-
ground, a practical or axiological Philosophy. Such a practical 
Philosophy has been needful for man in order to become some-
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES. 209 
thing more than a mere play of physical forces. Philosophy is 
thus on its two sides a wisdom of the Universe and of Life. 
The two aspects have often run parallel in several epochs of 
Philosophy, and even when this has not been the case the 
theoretical has become a kind of norm for the practical, which, 
in its turn, furnishes the theoretical with a new "creative 
synthesis." 
In the history of Philosophy the close connection of the two 
sides, if not simultaneously, still successively, is to be found. Thus 
in G-reece, during the pre-Socratic period, we find Philosophy 
arising out of purely speculative interests and gradually coming 
under the power of practical needs, so that what began as an 
interpetation of the Universe becomes in Plato and in early 
Christianity a Philosophy of the redemption of the life of man. 
When we come down to the period of the Eenaissance theo-
retical interests once again secure pre-eminence, and some of 
these theoretical results are turned during the period of the 
Aufklarung into the service of civilisation and culture. In 
Kant the two aspects find an intimate union; Philosophy with 
him becomes a view of the Universe and a view of Life. The 
two Critiques of Pure and of Practical Eeason are the results of 
such a union. Kant perceived that man was not only a know-
ing but also a willing being. This aspect of Kant's teaching has 
been much overlooked since his day. I t has to be borne in mind 
continually that man is not only capable of forming judgments 
concerning things but of realising at a deeper level than the under-
standing the judgments which he forms. I t is necessary for man 
to know, for Knowledge becomes a kind of goal for his "Will. 
I t is evident that to become what he knows includes a form of 
activity and the presence of a standpoint which were not 
included in the act of knowledge by itself. Consequently, 
Philosophy has to insist once again on this differentiation 
between theory and axiology, and to see that although a close 
connection exists between the two still the mental sciences 
which deal with the former handle a material and employ a 
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method partially different from those of the latter. The field of 
the mental sciences is thus portioned into two because different 
kinds of work are necessitated by the double nature of man. 
But, on the other hand, the connection between the theoretical 
and the practical is of the closest because the two arise within 
the same consciousness. As Windelband (to whom I am 
indebted for the above distinction) points out: Our judgments 
include an act of will; our insight is partially guided by 
conceptions of value and by motives of the will. The main 
point is that a division of labour has become necessary on 
account of the richness of the material and of the necessity of 
treating it in different ways. But the tendency to forget that 
there are two portions of the field is very often found in some 
of the Philosophies of our day. Our wall of partition is so 
high that we cannot see into our neighbour's garden; and by 
degrees we come to conclude that there is no garden there at 
al l! The distinction is also seen in the fact that the problems 
of Natural Science and of the Theory of Knowledge are 
problems of existing things, whilst the problems of Values have 
their existence only in relation to a Subject, and are therefore 
treated by those disciplines which deal with the Subject, viz., 
Ethics, ^Esthetics, and Religion. These disciplines do not 
deal with a theoretical content but with the relation of a 
subject to some End or Value. I t is true that theoretical 
disciplines like Logic consist of judgments which have a 
relation to the individual, and which are either affirmed or 
denied, and in so far must have value for the individual, for 
otherwise he would not select and reject, affirm and deny. 
Logic presents the individual with a pathway to Truth and is j 
consequently a discipline of the different values of things— I 
values which have a direct bearing on man's life. But before 
proceeding to the four sciences, Logic, ^Esthetics, Ethics, and 
Religion, which deal with Values in their relation to man's < 
life, we must inquire for a little while how Values come to j 
man. What aspects of his nature are at work in the creation ] 
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of Values ? In other words, we pass to the Psychology of 
Values, and finally to the actual Values themselves in their 
fourfold content. 
§4. Psychology of Values.—By this is not meant that 
Values are constructed upon a basis of Psychology, but that the 
processes which are operative when Values are formed can be 
analysed. 
Values involve a Subject-Object relation. " The object 
may include anything which satisfies a need or calls forth 
a feeling of pleasure. The latter definition—the feeling of 
pleasure—is the more inclusive of the two" (Windelband). 
The feeling of pleasure in one sense includes the satisfaction of 
a need. I t is difficult to decide whether Will or Feeling is 
the more original of the two functions. But it is certain 
that both are most closely connected. As a rule, this 
intimate connection has been neglected in many text-books on 
Psychology. And the emphasis laid on one at the expense of 
the other has often entered into the domain of Metaphysics. 
The battle between the Absolutists and the Pragmatists is 
largely based on the question which of the three phases of 
consciousness is the most original. But it does seem a mistake 
to separate and to build a closed system on the fragmentary 
phases of things which are never found apart. The advocates 
of Absolutism and Pragmatism are unconsciously reviving a 
view of consciousness which is Kantian in its nature and which 
has been discarded by the best psychologists. The truth 
concerning the two seems to be in the fact that whenever 
Consciousness acts it acts as a whole even though only one of 
its three phases may be in the foreground and prominent 
enough to be observed. In every act of Will there is some 
amount of Feeling, and in every Feeling there is always some 
amount of Will, if not more than enough to enable the Feeling 
to persist from being changed into something else. And the 
same is true of the relation of Thought to Feeling and Will. 
Still, in spite of this, there is some evidence that Feeling 
o 2 
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212 W. TUDOR JONES. 
may be traced back to a source more primitive than itself. I t 
can often be noticed that Feeling springs from a source of need or 
Will. When we look at the matter in this way pleasure is 
denned as a satisfaction of the Will, and pain as its dissatisfac-
tion. This is true when the subject is conscious of the presence 
of Will. But, besides this, the unconscious Will, which is 
designated as an impulse or need, is the origin of such feelings 
of hunger as pain and of satisfaction as pleasure. Such 
observation has grown into a theory that all pleasure or 
displeasure presupposes a Will, if not in a conscious form, 
still in the unconscious organic form which is designated as need 
and impulse. 
On the other hand, there can be brought against this theory 
of the priority of the Will the fact of the Feeling-element 
present in sensuous primary feelings such as of colour, tone, 
smell, taste, etc. There is here a conspicuous absence of the 
Will-element. I t seems true to state that there are primary 
feelings which cannot be classed as either pleasurable or 
painful. 
But the opposite theory of the primacy of the Will has 
much to show on the side of its priority. The Will, when 
viewed at its source, does not seem to be only the final stage of 
what started in Thought and proceeded to Feeling. Man is not 
merely a being of thought and of conscious action; he is as 
well a being of deep-rooted instincts which cannot be conscious 
of their Ends as pleasure. Sometimes the instinct reaches an 
End of pleasure; but often, as in perverse inclinations, man 
pursues relentlessly an End which culminates in pain even 
though he may know beforehand something of the nature of what 
will happen when the process has reached its culminating 
point. 
I have paraphrased the foregoing section from Windelband 
because it seems to me to express the impossibility of dividing 
man's nature into different compartments. I t is more correct 
to say, as Windelband does, that both Feeling and Will are 
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES. 213 
original functions of life, and that there is reciprocity between 
them throughout life. We thus see that the Values which 
present themselves to both Feeling and Will have, therefore, an 
influence which is exercised on both. 
This principle of transference between Feeling and Will 
is evident everywhere in life. Feeling may be often a state 
of dissatisfaction because some object which would satisfy some 
need is not yet attained. The self in the presence of such an 
experience becomes intensified and gathers various scattered 
elements together, which merge into its intensive centre until 
finally it becomes strong enough to find ways and means to 
realise its need—the Will reacts upon that part of the universe 
which at the moment is needful for the self. Thus a feeling of 
need, whether organic or mental, is transformed into a deed. 
In that feeling there might have been present elements of 
thought, and this is almost always the case in human beings, 
but in so far as such thought is present, it is thought blended 
with feeling towards some End which the self is desirous of 
reaching. But when the End has been reached and the Value 
obtained, what is the satisfaction of such a Value but another 
feeling on the pleasurable side ? Thus Feeling transformed 
itself into Will in order to reach its desired End, and Will in 
its turn transformed itself into Feeling. This kind of trans-
ference takes place right through life, so that, until much more 
light is cast on Feeling and Will, we shall have to look upon 
the two as original, complementary elements within human 
nature. 
But all that has been said in this section only deals with 
the How of the process, and, indeed, with the How in its 
elemental forms. But there • are higher elements in the pro-
cess. We are not dependent entirely upon primitive needs 
and their realisation. What differentiates the cultivated, 
moral man more than anything from his more primitive, crude 
ancestor is the fact that the former is capable of relegating to 
the background of his consciousness instincts and impulses 
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which otherwise would control life. There comes to be a 
growth of the reason why some things which are organic or 
primitive needs should be rejected, and why higher needs should 
be brought into existence, and a means for their satisfaction 
should be found. The naive view of finding the meaning of 
life in the presence and satisfaction of organic Feelings and in 
the exercise of a Will equally organic and primitive gives place 
to other aspects which man is bound to take into account, 
whether he feels or wills the need for this. Indeed, as soon as 
man realised himself as a member of a community he was 
obliged, not only to take his own needs into account, but the 
needs of others as well. He is now obliged to perceive that 
what may be valuable to him may be injurious to another, and 
that what may be pleasurable to him may be painful to another. 
Thus a conflict of Values arises, and some kind of Standard has 
to arise in order to measure each one's individual values. The 
very fact that human society has in the course of the ages 
somewhat progressed is a proof that such a Standard has been 
operative. I t has succeeded in enabling groups to live a con-
joint life. This could not have been possible unless some Value 
over against many of the organic and individual Values of each 
person should be seen as necessary and useful. Such a Value 
may be named Custom. Thus we have passed beyond the realm 
of Psychology with its individual values to the region of Over-
individual Values, and are consequently led into another 
division of the subject. 
§ 5. Groups of Values.—Taking up further the meaning of 
Custom, we find that its nucleus consists" in a reality which is 
objective in its character. I t is a reality not, like that presented 
by Natural Science, existing in Space, although the expression of 
it has to take always some kind of " incarnation " in Space if 
it is to persist. Its objectivity is, indeed, twofold. On the one 
hand, it is true that such a reality as Custom is in the mind 
of the individual, but its content is recognised as given quite 
as much as the objects of Natural Science are given. The 
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content of such a reality is a social inheritance for each 
individual—it is present at his birth. I t is true that he has 
to understand it, but he does not create it. And the miud 
is so framed as to be obliged to make a distinction between 
what is present as an over-individual experience and what is 
present as a subjective experience. This is the essential 
nature of the over-individual value of Custom or of anything 
else. No more than this would be needful to say about it if 
a group or a nation lived to itself and was not disturbed by 
other groups or nations that possessed other kinds of Customs. 
The Custom as a Value would persist, and would change only 
in the degree the life of the group or the nation underwent 
greater complexity. But if any group or nation had not been 
able to have given a tangible expression to its customs, such 
Values would very quickly disappear when they would be 
obliged to struggle amongst a community of people with customs 
of a different nature. Thus, for example, there has been no 
difficulty whatever in getting the Maoris of New Zealand to 
adopt the customs of Britain. Their own customs were all 
oral—there had been no " incarnation" of them : there was 
no literature and there were no institutions amongst them. 
The result has been that in one generation they have adopted 
our Values, sometimes for good, sometimes for evil, for them-
selves. They have been " converted" to our religion; those 
who could afford it have adopted our houses and furniture; 
they smoke our tobacco and drink our whisky; the men 
and the women are quite as susceptible to the need of 
wearing clothes and boots of the latest pattern as any group 
in this country. But how different it is in India! The 
conflict of Values has been infinitely greater there than in 
New Zealand. India had "incarnated" its past customs 
before we went there, and this helps them to persist, and 
renders it necessary for us even to modify some of our own 
customs there even so far as we ourselv«s are concerned. I 
think that this " incarnation " element in Values has been 
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greatly neglected in Philosophy, and that the objective 
character and persistency of Customs have been placed too 
much in the concept alone. The two sides—the mental and 
the tangible—have to be taken into account. 
Such Custom may be designated as the will of the community; 
and the point here to be borne in mind is that it has to be 
acknowledged as a true Value by the individual. As Windelband 
points out, it is in this that the psychological nature of 
Conscience is to be discovered. Conscience is therefore the 
voice of the consciousness of the total group in the indi-
vidual consciousness, which acts as a norm for the individual 
consciousness. Of course, Conscience does not remain at 
this over-individual level of Custom but applies to the 
over-individual levels of our four groups of Values. If 
this is so, we find a valuing of Values which exists partly 
in tangible expressions and partly in the total consciousness 
of the community. But an important difficulty arises here. 
When face to face with Custom, the individual has to remain 
passive and subservient to a reality and command which forces 
itself upon him. He is not able to do this entirely, or else there 
could be no progress. Customs have changed and do perpetually, 
if only gradually, change. The individual, in his turn, reacts upon 
such a reality. He may discover it as a mixture of the rational and 
the irrational, and consequently finds it necessary to change the 
character of the custom. Some need of the individual is not 
satisfied with what is presented to him in this form of custom, 
although the initial stages of his life may have been helped in 
this manner. He now finds that he has to turn to something 
else than the mere pleasure and security which Custom offers 
him. And it is at this point that the problems of practical or 
axiological Philosophy really begin. Where is the individual to 
turn for the satisfaction of his nature ? 
We have already seen that, in the first place, every Value 
signifies something that satisfies a need or gives rise to a 
feeling of pleasure. We have further seen from the instance of 
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES. 217 
Custom that the value does not reside in the object itself but in 
some Good that is felt necessary by the individual. We have to 
bear in mind here that often what seems good and is even felt as a 
Good may be an evil. The Maoris, for instance, have not gained 
by all the Customs they have copied from Britishers. But they 
felt the need for these things and many of them sold their lands 
so as to be able to live in the towns within easy access of the 
things. But at a later stage they felt that even evil things are 
made by a community to look as decent as possible: the Maoris 
have paid some attention to the ethos of Britishers. But, as 
already stated, Customs may be often good. They exercise a 
restraining influence over primitive instincts, impulses, and 
passions. Another kind of life takes the place of the old life— 
new Values come into existence and throw the old ones into a 
subsidiary place. But this stage is passed, though its " ghost " 
remains haunting the man throughout his life. No man can get 
out entirely from the level of Custom. But he does ask the 
question concerning not merely what is but also concerning what 
ought to be—in other words, he becomes the possessor of an 
Ideal. His nature, even in the ethos of the community, found 
new Values, and four groups at least of Ideals now appear to 
him as means by which the new intellectual and spiritual needs 
of his nature can be satisfied. 
In the words of the late Otto Liebmann " man finds himself 
the possessor of a logical conscience the ideal of which is Truth; 
there is an aesthetic conscience whose ideal is the Beautiful; 
there is a moral conscience and its ideal is the Good." To 
Liebmann's triad we may add Windelband's and Munsterberg's 
religious or metaphysical conscience whose ideal consists in the 
unity of the other three ideals and in the final satisfaction 
which it brings to man. This is termed God. 
It is to these Values we now turn, to see some of the ways 
by means of which the various aspects of man's nature grow and 
find satisfaction. 
§ 6. Logical Values.—The logical ideal or value as Truth 
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constitutes a portion of the work of theoretical Philosophy. It is 
the aspect of Logic which relates to the individual and its effect 
upon life that has to be dealt with in a Philosophy of Values. As 
already pointed out the two aspects of Philosophy are connected. 
Logic deals with something of far greater significance than the 
forms of thought. In its objective character it compels us to 
think the world in certain determined ways; its laws place 
alternatives before the human mind; its judgments distinguish 
between truth and error. I t deals in this and other respects 
with the conceptions of the natural and the mental sciences, and 
its influence is felt even within the provinces of ^Esthetics, Ethics, 
and Eeligion, although it cannot be said that it is the determining 
factor in experience at the level of Esthetics, Ethics, and Eeligion. 
To obey the modes presented by the necessities of Thought is 
something of the greatest importamce in the development of 
personality, although such modes may appear purely intellectual 
in their nature. Even if such a function of Logic were entirely 
confined to the intellectual realm, it would still possess great 
value because it would still enable the person who follows the 
demands of Thought and the dicta of Judgments to construct some 
kind of valid universe within his own consciousness. Such a 
personality would be richer in content than one who had not 
made the attempt, for he would be able to select and reject, to 
present before himself Ends, and partially to reach such Ends 
at least in Thought. The knowledge of the right way of 
handling the material which presents itself to man or which 
is sought by him is a Value: it filters some power into the 
mind, and has a relation to the Will on an important side. To 
adopt and follow the logical process in the handling of material 
requires at every step an act of discrimination between the various 
Values of the material either for himself or for the theory of the 
Universe or of Life into which the inquirer wishes to penetrate. 
However impersonal the material may seem, it is of importance 
to the individual because material is often impersonal, not 
because it has no connection with the individual as individual, 
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but because it has connection with, and is of importance to, all 
individuals. A theory of the Universe or of Life if it is true 
is true for all and good for all. The individual is thus in his 
battle for the possession of Truth a combatant in an over-
individual struggle for the ever deeper possession of a Truth 
whose nucleus will persist over against the fleeting impressions 
of the moment. In other words, he is battling for the possession 
of an over-individual world which will satisfy the needs of his 
reason. The satisfaction of this demand of the intellectual 
nature of mau must produce a change in him. Or, as 
Munsterberg says: " What else does that mean than that we 
grasp the elements, the parts, the groups, perhaps the whole of 
this chaos, and hold every bit of our experience before us as 
something which is to be more than a passing dream, more 
than a glowing spark. To have a world means to hold up the 
flying experience as something which is not to be experience 
only, but is to be itself. And yet what else can it mean to tell 
our experience to be itself, than to impart to it a will that it is 
to last, that it is to remain itself, independent of our individual 
experience; that it is to aim toward the preservation of its 
own reality ; that it is to strive for loyalty to its own nature, 
To make a world out of our experience means, and cannot 
mean anything else than, to apperceive every bit of the chaos 
as something which must will to be itself. . . . . To be 
itself may mean, firstly, that our bit of experience is to be 
preserved, is to last through ever new experiences, and is to 
be found again and again. The satisfaction of this demand 
gives us the Values of Truth."* As Munsterberg points out 
further: " In the field of the logical values of reality it 
means that we have not only the immediate acknowledgment 
of things, persons, and duties, but also the created values of 
causal, historical, and logical knowledge."! The demand for 
* Science and Idealism, pp. 38, 39. 
t Ibid., p. 50. 
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Truth is thus a demand for something over-individual that 
shall persist. Even Science is thus in its final meaning 
idealistic, for it is nothing other than the effect of our efforts 
that our interpretation of the world is real and shall persist. 
The conclusions of the natural and the logical sciences are 
therefore independent of any " personal setting." But although 
these conclusions are independent of the likes or dislikes, of 
the pleasure or the pain of each individual, they still form 
a kind of intellectual categorical imperative to which the 
individual must conform and must carry still further. I t is 
in this sense that the logical values of Truth become of 
importance to man—they demand from him an acknowledg-
ment of a world of Truth which is independent of his own 
particular truth. If there were opportunity, it could be 
shown that the work of the historian resembles that of the 
scientist in many ways. The material of the two is different— 
that of the latter being the physical world, and that of 
the former being the world of will-relations. Out of the 
factors of will-relations an over-individual world is framed; 
and it is this over-individual world of History which persists 
and grows and becomes a norm for the individual events 
of Time. But this is not the whole history of man's nature. 
The fact is that the possibilities of his nature are so many-
sided that they cannot be satisfied in one direction only. 
The values of Truth are cognitive in their nature—at least 
it is cognition which remains in the foreground—though the 
affective and conative aspects are also affected. But they, 
too, in their turn must come to the foreground, and when 
they come we shall see that other aspects of reality will 
suddenly spring into being and develop possibilities on the 
affective and conative sides. Thus we pass to ^Esthetic Values. 
§ 7. JEsthetic Values.—In the previous section we found that 
the Values of Truth were mainly over-individual and not direct, 
personal experiences of the individual. They had a direct 
influence upon him, but it is not he as an individual that 
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created them. The very structure of the world gave the 
material for such a construction and compelled the mind to 
move in the groove marked out for it. But man, much as 
he needs such truth, needs also something-, however small it 
may be, which is more his own. It is not given to every man 
to follow Truth as far as to be able to construct an open 
systematic view of the Universe, and it is not given to any 
man to frame a closed and complete system. So both types of 
men require 'their constructions to be supplemented by some-
thing else—something which is a deep need of human nature, 
something which cannot be expressed in words. There are 
things outside us and within us which do not allow themselves 
to be expressed in words. There are thoughts, feelings, and 
intuitive and imaginative knowledge which cannot be placed 
into the mould of logical Judgments. We have to confess with 
Faust: 
Ich habe keinen Namen 
Dafiir. Gefiihl ist alles. 
Now, to be itself was the main point emphasized in a Truth 
which is not relative, and which may be designated as absolute 
in so far as it was not created by the mind of any individual, and • 
which has become an over-individual norm for the individual. 
Such a Truth has its own self-subsistence. But the individual 
requires, feels the need of becoming something self-subsistent 
in himself—in a form of immediacy. The individual claims, 
at least in a part of his being, the need of becoming inde-
pendent, complete in himself, "not looking for any help or 
addition, and fulfilling all his desires through himself." 
"Wherever an experience comes to us in perfect fulfilment 
of this demand, there the world has aesthetic value."* Even 
here the individual is dependent upon material from the 
outside, but the material affects him in a different way from 
what it did in the realm of Truth. From the external world 
the beauty of nature presents its material; from the social 
* Miinsterberg, Idealism and Life, p. 54. 
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world the unity, harmony, and affection of men and women 
constitute the material; and in the world of his own inner life 
it is the equilibrium and unity of his own nature that furnishes 
the material. The very same material may be valued in 
different ways. A young man's father told me the other day 
that, in spite of his son's splendid achievement in the science 
examinations of the University of London, he still felt that a 
side of his son's nature was on the point of becoming atrophied. 
Father and son went out often to the country and observed the 
beauty of earth, sea, and sky. The son saw nothing but his 
own science in every object, and was entirely incapable of 
obtaining any pleasure from any landscape, however beautiful, 
as a whole. The father found the same material sufficient to 
give him strength to carry on his laborious work for the next 
week in a crowded part of London. The son passed from 
cause to effect and from effect to cause; the father was able 
to pick out from the remainder of the world the bit which he 
perceived and find it complete, absolute, and satisfying. And 
it is the same with every material in all the sciences. I t may 
be handled analytically and synthetically from a logical stand-
point, and it may be viewed in its totality, as a complete picture 
is viewed. The value produced in the latter sense is that of 
enjoyment. How much intellect is present in the process it is 
difficult to detect, but however much there is it has to be 
melted into the complete feeling-view which human beings 
are able to possess. I am inclined to think that there is more 
intellect in the process than some writers on ^Esthetics are apt 
to think, for country people with a minimum of intelligence are 
not very capable of appreciating the landscape of their own 
neighbourhood—a neighbourhood which may draw some of the 
best artists to it every year in the early summer and the early 
autumn. 
Esthetic values of sculpture, painting, poetry, drama, and 
music have all had their great values in the civilising and 
moralising processes of mankind. They are over-individual in 
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their nature, but they differ from the intellectual over-
individual in that they gain an entrance in the form of 
immediacy to the soul. They are less difficult of apprehension 
than intellectual truth and do not require the effort which is 
included in the attainment of the Good. They are all-important 
values in a world such as ours where but few can hope to 
attain to a View of the Universe, and where rest and enjoyment 
are sometimes needed after labouring hard to overcome some 
weakness of the nature. This is the effect of their value upon 
the recipient. What constitutes their creation is quite another 
question, into which I cannot here enter. 
But there is a danger of making iEsthetic Values the sole 
Values of life. The world is meant for alternate periods of 
effort and rest—effort in the intellectual and moral realm, 
rest in the realm of the Beautiful. As pointed out above, 
Consciousness is many-sided, and there exists a real danger 
to it by making one side pre-eminent and by ignoring other 
sides. Something of value is lost, and only a partial develop-
ment of the nature can take place. We must now pass to the 
third section of Values. 
§ 8. Ethical Values.—Wherever in life we look we find, 
over against the ordinary daily life and its values, a command 
that has to be obeyed and whose value consists in its realisa-
tion. Everywhere such a command is presupposed, however 
much the individual may fail to understand the nature of it. 
This command is termed Duty or Moral Law. This Moral Law 
is differentiated from the multiplicity of relations in which man 
finds himself from day to day. Life has grown from lower to 
higher levels by means of individual and over-individual 
qualities. I t has already been hinted that a fundamental 
difference exists between the individual and the over-individual 
elements in human nature. In the remarks on the collective 
life of the Community, expressing itself as the Will of the 
Community, there was seen to be present a reality over-
individual in its nature. The history, necessity, and value 
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of this over-individual reality for every individual in the Com-
munity, for the preservation of the Community, for the 
superiority of the Community as a whole to any individual, 
has conferred upon such a reality an imperative character. 
I t has become a Sollen (an Ought). I t is thus differentiated 
from the reality of the natural world which merely is; it 
is also differentiated from the reality of the sesthetic world 
because it cannot be attained without an activity of the 
Will, and also because it is something which is to he 
attained, and not, as on the aesthetic level, something which 
is already attained and enjoyed. The self is conscious of this 
interval between the Ought and the Is even when it does not 
make an effort to travel the distance. It is conscious that one 
of the main values of life consists in that which is beyond the 
individual, however much the individual has already realised. 
The self is aware that it is in becoming the content of this 
imperative that a main value of life consists. This is no mere 
theory but the actual experience of what the social world 
presents as a demand for man to conform with. The demand 
is here again over-individual in its nature; it is not the creation 
of any one individual but something which has persisted and 
has constituted the actual evolution of the human world. The 
human world has thus created a reality beyond itself, greater than 
any individual experience, and persisting and growing though 
each generation passes away. Such a reality is independent of 
the pleasure of the individual, and the individual is aware that 
he cannot withdraw from it except at the peril of losing some of 
the greatest Values of life. He knows, or can know, that this 
greatest Value is in the Sollen and not in the Sein around him. 
E. L. Nettleship* expresses it beautifully : " I have a real con-
viction at times of something that is in and about me, in the 
consciousness of which I am free from desire and fear—some-
thing which would make it easy to accomplish the most 
* Philosophical Remains, p. 107. 
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otherwise difficult thing without any other motive except that 
it was the one thing worth doing." " Such a value is beyond 
the grasp of the mere scientific treatment of the events in 
nature and in mind."* The main point that should be 
emphasised in Ethics is not only its descriptive character but 
also its imperative. This work of Practical Philosophy is 
looked upon by many philosophers as being greatly inferior 
to the relation of subject and object, of mind and body, etc. 
I t is a province which will probably not yield such an 
intellectual harvest as Psychology, but it will be of incal-
culable benefit to the human race, and may be able to make 
Philosophy a living discipline to the world at large. 
§ 9. Religious and Metaphysical Values.—Neither of the 
three systems of Values touches the whole nature of man. I t 
is clear that he has to work in the three spheres if his per-
sonality is to unfold and deepen. But as he cannot get his 
whole nature into activity in any one of these Values, and as 
only one of them can occupy the consciousness at the same 
time, the final quest of life is for a unity which embraces the 
three. This constitutes the religious or metaphysical value of 
life. This level of experience means that consciousness now 
rests upon the final convictions it has gained from the other 
provinces and experiences them as one. As each of the 
other provinces was formed by binding the multiplicity of 
the material into a unity, so these three unities may 
become final convictions in which the final, absolute Values 
of life are to be experienced. As Miinsterberg puts it (and 
Windelband and Eucken put it in a similar way): " That 
which completely fulfils it (this demand of our nature) is the 
system of our convictions. Their immediate form is religion. 
If we transcend the outer world by our convictions we 
come to God; if we transcend the social world we come 
to immortality; if we transcend our own inner sphere and 
* Miinsterberg, Science and Idealism, p. 61. 
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link it with religion we come to the belief in providential 
leading. In every one of these. conceptions, the world of 
things and of men and of duties is developed into a system in 
which the logical, sesthetical, and ethical demands are unified, 
in which the causal events of the universe and the moral 
duties and the desire for happiness are no longer in conflict. 
Eeligion, too, can speak a hundred languages, as the logical, 
aesthetic, and ethical demands which must be harmonised may 
vary from man to man, from time to time. But the value of 
the conviction that the reality in which we live, if we knew it 
completely, would be perfectly harmonious in the totality 
of its demands, is eternal and absolute."* A practically 
identical conclusion to the subject might be obtained from 
Mr. Bradley, while Dr. Bosanquet's conclusion is not far 
removed from such a standpoint. We see that we have 
landed ourselves in a transcendent realm, in a supersensuous 
and over-individual world. Surely Philosophy is not to throw 
such demands and possibilities of man's nature into a realm 
of illusion which is soon to be passed by an adoption of 
the " scientific method in Philosophy." Far rather should it 
be the aim of Philosophy to labour among the greater as well 
as among the lesser values, for I am convinced that it is in 
such a metaphysical conclusion as I have only too hurriedly 
tried to sketch that the future of any genuine Philosophy lies. 
* Ibid., p. 65. 
 by guest on June 9, 2016
http://aristotelian.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
